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This article challenges the validity of recent suggestions that shared 
history underpins India-Australia relations through an historical analysis 
of little-known diplomats who worked for the Indian High Commission in 
Australia and the Australian High Commission in India immediately after 
Indian independence. Based on largely unexplored archival material from 
India, Australia, and Canada, it argues that Australia’s racialized identity, as 
expressed through the White Australia policy, thoroughly shaped Indian 
perceptions of Australia. While Indian policy makers never officially voiced 
their distaste for White Australia, Indian diplomats put their efforts into 
reshaping the image of India in Australia through travel and personal 
contacts as part of an effort to educate Australia about India. Likewise, 
Australia’s colonial identity led it to see India and Indian foreign policy as 
“irrational” due to its emphasis on racial discrimination and decolonization. 
It is argued that, far from underpinning the relationship, colonial histories 
and subsequent postcolonial identities have played an important role in 
fracturing India-Australia relations. 
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Introduction: Colonial History as Shared History?
Recent efforts to create a new and deeper relationship between India and Australia have narrated the relationship in particular ways. We are told India and Australia share history,1 values,2 region (the “Indo-
Pacific”),3 and a “natural” partnership.4 Recently deposed Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott went as far as to argue for the benefits given to India 
through its colonization, emphasizing India’s Westminster system of 
government and the English language as the primary evidence.5 Similarly, 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has argued that India and Australia understand 
one another “instinctively.”6 
The idea that shared history underpins India-Australia relations was at its 
strongest when Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to 
address a joint sitting of Australia’s Parliament in November 2014. When 
introducing Modi, Abbott stated that “Australians admired the way India 
won independence—not by rejecting the values learned from Britain, but 
by appealing to them; not by fighting the colonisers, but by working on their 
conscience.”7 Modi suggested also that India is linked to Australia “by the 
great Indian Ocean; by our connected history and our many shared 
inheritances—and, even more by our deeply interlinked destinies.”8 This 
type of discourse goes beyond asserting shared interests and a shared identity, 
to claim that India and Australia have always shared an identity. Modi’s choice 
of example, tying India and Australia together through colonial history, 
though, was telling: “More than 150 years ago, an Australian novelist and 
lawyer John Lang fought the legal battle for a brave Indian freedom fighter, 
the Queen of Jhansi, Rani Laxmi Bai against the British East India Company 
in India’s first War of Independence.”9
__________________
1 Craig Emerson, “Old Friends and New Partners,” Science Technology Innovation: Australia and 
India, Australia-India Institute Task Force Report (Melbourne: Australia India Institute, 6 May 2014) 
at http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/LOW%20RES%20INNOV%20REPORT.pdf.
2 Andrew Robb, “Australia-India Roundtable Dialogue” (speech, Melbourne, 6 February 2014), 
http://trademinister.gov.au/speeches/2014/ar_sp_140206.html.
3 Australian Department of Defence, “Defence White Paper, 2013,” http://www.defence.gov.
au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf.
4 Stephen Smith, “Ministerial Statement on the Australia-India Relationship” (speech, Canberra, 
9 February 2010), http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2010/100209_australia_india.html.
5 Tony Abbott, Battlelines (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2011), 158–161.
6 Julie Bishop, “Address to Liberal Friends of India Launch” (speech, Sydney, 13 April 2013), 
http://juliebishop.com.au/address-to-liberal-friends-of-india-launch/.
7 Tony Abbott, “Address to Parliament, House of Representatives” (speech, Canberra, 18 
November 2014) http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2014/11/18/prime-minister-address-
parliament-house-representatives-parliament-house.
8 Narendra Modi, “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Address to the Joint Session of the Australian 
Parliament,” (speech, Canberra, 18 November 2014) http://www.narendramodi.in/prime-minister-
narendra-modis-address-to-the-joint-session-of-the-australian-parliament. 









































































Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
Where Abbott had cited various battles to protect British colonial interests 
such as Gallipoli, Tobruk, Singapore, and El Alamein,10 Modi cited a lone 
Australian lawyer defending a “freedom fighter” after India’s “First War of 
Independence.” This comment undermined Abbott’s assertion that India 
fought its colonizers solely by appealing to their values and revealed a very 
different vision of this supposed shared history.11 Clearly, while both leaders 
argue that there is a shared history between India and Australia, these 
histories have very different meanings. Given India’s centrality to the shifting 
nature of contemporary international politics in the Asia-Pacific, it is essential 
to critically consider how likely this new attempt at creating a deeper 
partnership will be. 
In this article, I consider the claim that shared history underpins India-
Australia relations by looking at the identity politics in the relationship 
immediately after Indian independence. Rather than solely re-examining 
the great men and the big moments of India-Australia relations, I focus on 
the perceptions of Other at play in the day-to-day diplomatic missions between 
these two states. Although these two institutions were the most intimate site 
of India-Australia relations, little has been written on either of them, 
particularly the Indian High Commission in Canberra. I primarily analyze 
archival documents, many of which have not been previously examined. Due 
to the scarcity of Indian archival material, this is bolstered when necessary 
with diplomats’ personal narratives, newspaper coverage, and reference to 
Prime Ministers Nehru, Chifley, and Menzies. This analysis is tied to the 
ambivalent place India and Australia held in one another’s identities, in 
which colonial histories both connected and separated the two states. As will 
be seen, Australian diplomats tended to view India’s foreign policy as 
needlessly concerned by postcolonial issues, whereas Indian diplomats tended 
to perceive Australia as engaging in Cold War realpolitik on the basis of 
racialized fears. The dynamics of the relationship, in which both sides failed 
to understand one another, made it almost impossible for a close relationship 
to be built. I argue on this basis that shared colonial histories and subsequent 
postcolonial identities have actually been divisive in India-Australia relations. 
This allows for a reinterpretation of India-Australia relations as well as a new 
perspective on the ways in which India’s postcolonial identity continues to 
shape its contemporary foreign policy.
Understanding India-Australia Relations 
India-Australia relations present a paradox for mainstream international 
relations (IR) theories. Liberal theorists have argued that the growth in the 
__________________
10 Abbott, “Address to Parliament.” 
11 On this point, see Priya Chacko and Alexander E. Davis, “The Natural/Neglected Relationship: 
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relationship is natural, as the two are both liberal democracies.12 And yet, 
India and Australia have long been democracies, and this has not produced 
a close relationship. What little realist analysis has been done, however, has 
been just as problematic. Andrea Benvenuti has emphasized the Cold War 
as keeping these two states apart,13 but without consulting Indian archival 
sources. Benvenuti’s evidence shows that Australian diplomats largely 
perceived the relationship as being held back by Cold War politics.14 Nihal 
Kurrupu argues that the Cold War was central to the failure of India-Australia 
relations. He acknowledges postcolonial issues were a factor, but primarily 
suggests that the relationship was held back by a Cold War split in which 
India was driven by “idealism” and that Australia had embraced the “realist 
orthodoxy” of the period.15 Contemporary strategic thought echoes this, 
with Medcalf and Raja-Mohan attributing India’s and Australia’s mediocre 
relationship solely to the Cold War.16 As will be seen, however, analysis of 
Indian archival sources reveals that Indian diplomats were as concerned with 
postcolonial issues as they were with geopolitical ones. Emphasizing the Cold 
War as the central factor silences and delegitimizes India’s efforts to create 
a postracial world order after its independence.17 In the case of the India-
Australia relationship, then, the realist emphasis on geopolitics has proven 
misleading as it silences important non-military aspects of Indian foreign 
policy.
How then, are we to understand the relationship? An answer lies in a new 
stream of thought on Indian foreign policy, which emphasizes India’s colonial 
history and its postcolonial identity. Postcolonial theory offers not only an 
important critique of Western IR theory, as will be discussed below, but also 
a useful means for analyzing state identity. Priya Chacko has considered the 
Nehruvian ideational project of creating a more ethical modernity as a 
foundational narrative of Indian foreign policy.18 Nehru’s emphasis on non-
alignment and peaceful co-existence defined India’s postcolonial identity. 
__________________
12 See for example Ramesh Thakur, “Natural Allies a World Apart,” Canberra Times, 25 February 
2013 http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/natural-allies-a-world-apart-20130224-2ezr9.html.
13 Andrea Benvenuti, “Difficult Partners: Indo-Australian Relations at the Height of the Cold 
War, 1949–1964,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 57, no. 1 (2011): 53–67. 
14 Benvenuti, “Difficult Partners.”
15 Nihal H. Kurrupu, Non-Alignment and Peace Versus Military Alignment and War (Delhi: Academic 
Foundation, 2004).
16 Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India and 
Middle Power Coalitions,” Lowy Institute (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2014) 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/responding_to_indo-pacific_rivalry_0.pdf.
17 Manu Bhagavan, The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World (Delhi: Harper Collins 
India, 2012). IR theory has generally neglected decolonization, and, for Nicholas Guilhot, early realist 
theory intentionally removed it as an issue from IR’s agenda. See Nicholas Guilhot, “Imperial Realism: 
Post-War IR Theory and Decolonisation,” The International History Review 36, no. 4 (2014): 698–720. 










































































Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
Chacko further argues that the founding Nehruvian discourse of Indian 
foreign policy has remained central, even in the post-1991 liberal era of 
Indian politics as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could not fully escape it 
in their time in power from 1998 to 2004.19 Within this literature, India’s 
identity is seen as inseparable from its foreign policy and its geopolitics.
India’s foreign policy has been guided by its opposition to imperialism, 
Afro-Asian and later global southern solidarity and non-alignment. In the 
contemporary setting, this same identity can be seen in India’s recent calls 
for a “polycentric” world order, most noticeable in a recent India-Russia 
joint statement,20 its continued resistance to the hierarchical order of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the forum between major developing states Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (known as BRICS) and its joining of 
anti-Western coalitions at the World Trade Organization (WTO).21 
It is important to remember that during the Nehru years India and 
Australia disagreed over many important geopolitical issues, such as the 
formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and conflicts 
in Suez, Vietnam, and Korea and the broader Cold War. These are doubtless 
important causes that fractured the relationship. Still, in each case, India’s 
anti-colonial identity can be seen as underpinning its political position. The 
frailties of the India-Australia relationship were caused not just by a clash of 
ideologies, a clash of personalities, or simply Cold War geopolitics, although 
all are important. From a constructivist perspective, all these geopolitical 
disputes were underpinned by state identity.
Emphasizing historically constructed identities allows us to take a new 
perspective on the ways in which shared histories have shaped the relationship. 
Colonial histories led to postcolonial identities, which continue to shape 
foreign policies long after independence. Australia gained a sense of security 
from its connection to Britain and its alliance with the US (its great and 
powerful friends). Indians, however, were subjugated and discriminated 
against. This clash can still be seen in Abbott’s and Modi’s statements to the 
Australian parliament. Both looked back to the colonial period, but drew 
very different lessons. The nature of the past might be that its influence 
becomes less and less tangible, yet this certainly does not mean that it does 
not matter. Rather, as Gwenda Tavan suggests with regards to the White 
Australia policy, history dies a long, slow death.22 
__________________
19 Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy, 165–195. For other examples, see Itty Abraham, The Making of 
the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (Delhi: South Asia Books, 1999) and 
Latha Varadarajan, “Constructivism, Identity and Neoliberal (in)security,” Review of International Studies 
30, no. 3 (2004): 319–341.
20 Priya Chacko, “Why India doesn’t support Western sanctions on Russia,” East Asia Forum 6 May 
2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/06/why-india-doesnt-support-western-sanctions-on-
russia. 
21 Amrita Narlikar, “Is India a Responsible Great Power?” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 9 (2011): 
1607–1621.
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I draw also on postcolonial approaches to IR. This is a small but growing 
set of work in IR which has sought to critique the Eurocentric construction 
of IR theory while also seeking to show how colonial histories have shaped 
broader international politics.23 Postcolonialism has also led scholars to seek 
theories more accommodating of difference than traditional theories of 
liberalism and realism. Constructivism in IR has also helped in this process 
through its emphasis on historically constructed identities.24 For L.H.M. 
Ling, postcolonialism fits comfortably with a constructivist approach. Simply 
speaking, I deploy, as Ling has succinctly summarized, a “constructivist 
method of studying IR,” coupled with “[p]ostcolonialism’s interpretation of 
world politics.”25 
The Historiography of India-Australia Relations
There have been few studies of the India-Australia relationship influenced by 
IR theory, and none influenced by postcolonialism or constructivism.26 Some 
important historical work, however, has been performed. In a wide-ranging 
contribution, Meg Gurry emphasizes Chifley’s support for decolonization, 
Indian independence, and India’s joining of the Commonwealth as 
suggesting a positive relationship could have developed.27 Following the fall 
of Chifley, she emphasizes Menzies’ and Nehru’s difficult personal 
relationship, and the way in which their different world views limited the 
relationship.28 Elsewhere, she suggests that the White Australia policy might 
still shape the two countries’ relationship, as shown by the Indian media’s 
response to attacks on Indian students in Australia in 2008.29 
Christopher Waters and David Goldsworthy have considered postcolonial 
issues in the context of Australia’s relationship with Asia as a whole, rather 
than specifically discussing India (or another state).30 David Walker has 
analyzed Australia’s anxieties over its proximity to Asia and how this shaped 
__________________
23 John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 
1760–2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); L.H.M. Ling, Postcolonial International 
Relations, Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
24 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200.
25 Ling, Postcolonial International Relations, 61.
26 Meg Gurry, Australia and India: Mapping the Journey, 1944–2014 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2015); Eric Meadows, “‘He No Doubt Felt Insulted’: The White Australia Policy and 
Australia’s Relations with India, 1944–1964,” in Australia and the World: A Festschrift for Neville Meaney, 
eds. Joan Beaumont and Matt Jordan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013), 81–98.
27 Gurry, Australia and India, 11–37.
28 Gurry, Australia and India, 38–73.
29 Meg Gurry, “India, the New Centre of Gravity: Australia-India Relations under the Howard 
Government,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (2012): 304. 
30 Christopher Waters, “After decolonization: Australia and the emergence of the non-aligned 
movement in Asia, 1954–55,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 2 (2001): 153–174; D. Goldsworthy, Losing 









































































Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
Australia’s development.31 While this reveals Australia’s struggles with 
engaging Asia, it has left an important gap, as it does not consider Indian 
(or other Asian) perceptions of Australia. 
Diplomatic historian Eric Meadows has examined the question of whether 
or not the White Australia policy shaped India-Australia relations, using the 
tools of an empirical historian. He concludes that the policy “cannot be said 
to have affected [the relationship] in any significant way.”32 This conclusion 
is due partly to the lack of surviving and available sources from Indian 
diplomats, in comparison with the wealth of detail available at the National 
Archives of Australia (NAA). Meadows’ conclusive and titular quote comes 
not from an Indian diplomat, but an Australian one. However, when we 
depart from seeing White Australia as a set of immigration policies but instead 
view it as a part of Australia’s racialized identity, we arrive at very different 
conclusions. 
The need to bring more Indian voices to the story of India-Australia 
relations, however, makes purely empirical analysis problematic. The volume 
of sources at the National Archives of India (NAI) is far smaller than at the 
NAA. Although some material has now been declassified, this is only a tiny 
percentage of what was produced.33 Based on my searches through the 
indexes produced in the 1940s and 1950s, only approximately 10 percent of 
what was produced has been kept and declassified. Due to these difficulties, 
it will likely never be possible for the empirical record of Indian diplomacy 
to match that of Australia’s. As a balanced empirical account is impossible, 
we must look for alternatives. In this case, examining the available source 
material for identity is a more productive method than reading it empirically, 
as it enables us to bring Indian voices to the fore without being overwhelmed 
by the greater availability of Australian material. As such, I examine the 
perceptions of Other of three Indian high commissioners to Australia: 
Ragunath Paranjpye, Daya Singh Bedi, and Kodandera Cariappa. I 
complement this with a brief analysis of the Australia High Commission 
under Iven Mackay and Herbert Gollan.34 In particular, however, I offer a 
reinterpretation of Crocker’s time in India, where he served as Australia’s 
high commissioner in Delhi from 1952 to 1955.
In selecting these little-known diplomats, I am also influenced by a recent 
trend in studies of India’s international history that seeks to de-emphasize the 
“great man” of Indian foreign policy, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru’s contribution 
__________________
31 David Walker, Anxious nation: Australia and the rise of Asia, 1850–1939 (St. Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1999); Christopher Waters, “After decolonization,” 153–174; D. Goldsworthy, Losing 
the Blanket.
32 Meadows, “‘He No Doubt felt Insulted’” 81–98.
33 For a full list of which files are declassified by the MEA, see: http://www.idsa.in/resources/
ListofdeclassifiedfilesoftheMinistryofExternalAffairsfrom19031972.html, accessed 5 November 2014.
34 Although he uses a different method of reading source material, this period is covered well 
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was no doubt indispensable, but is insufficient for a full understanding of 
Indian diplomacy. Manu Bhaghavan and Vineet Thakur have both recently 
suggested that India’s creative efforts to make peace and to reshape 
international politics have been understudied by diplomatic historians.35 
Aside from seeking peace, India also resisted racial discrimination and fought 
for decolonization through its foreign policy. This lack of analysis has been 
furthered by IR’s tendency to eschew archival research (particularly in India) 
in favour of theorizing. Nehru’s relative silence on “White Australia” has led 
to a lack of examination of Australia’s racialized identity as shaping India-
Australia relations. Examination of the Indian diplomats working in Australia, 
however, reveals a very different situation. 
Treating Australian identity as postcolonial is unusual in IR.36 Australia 
had control over its own foreign policy after World War Two for the first 
time, which it used to ally itself more closely with the US instead of the UK. 
Still, its foreign policy identity was firmly rooted in conceptions of itself as a 
White British settler-colony.37 As Suares has shown, Ben Chifley pursued an 
independent and creative vision of Australian foreign policy until his electoral 
defeat in 1949. Under Chifley’s leadership, Australia supported Indian 
independence and went on to support its position within the Commonwealth 
as a republic. Similarly, India’s positive response to the MacMahon Ball 
mission of 1948 and the lock-step response of India and Australia to quelling 
Dutch aggression in Indonesia in 1949 suggested that this creative narrative, 
in which Australia was part of Asia, could bring about a more productive 
relationship between the two states.38 However, Menzies, who was in power 
from 1949 to 1966, was far more careful and regarded Asia as threatening, 
rather than presenting opportunities, and famously regarded himself as 
“British to the bootstraps.” 39 Although it was contested, as Menzies was in 
power for much of the period examined here, this identity had the more 
profound influence over foreign policy. Australia’s postcolonial ambivalence 
in this period, then, can be seen in a debate over the extent to which Australia 
was “European” or “part of Asia.” Despite India’s, and Nehru’s, own 
ambivalences with Englishness and colonialism, it is clear that Nehruvian 
foreign policy sought to resist the continuation of colonial hierarchy and 
__________________
35 Bhagavan, The Peacemakers; Vineet Thakur, “India’s Diplomatic Entrepreneurism: Revisiting 
India’s Role in the Korean Crisis, 1950–1952” China Report 49, no. 273 (2013): 273–298.
36 Alexander E. Davis, “Rethinking Australia’s International Colonial Past: Identity, Foreign Policy 
and India in the Australian Colonial Imagination,” The Flinders Journal of History and Politics 29 (2013): 
70–96.
37 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
38 For discussion of Dutch-Indonesia aggression, see Gurry, Australia and India, 28–32; Julie 
Suares, “Engaging with Asia: The Chifley Government and the New Delhi Conferences of 1947 and 
1949,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 57, no. 4 (2011): 495–510. 









































































Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
racial discrimination in global politics. The White Australia policy was one 
such example. 
Differences in Australian identity can further be seen through different 
perceptions of India’s position in the Commonwealth. Whereas Menzies 
wished for a unified, “white” Commonwealth, Chifley (as did Nehru) saw 
advantages in a multi-racial, open forum for the discussion of international 
ideas. While Chifley supported India’s membership as a republic, Menzies 
as opposition leader argued passionately against India joining as a republic, 
stating that “[t]o people like myself, it will remain completely mysterious as 
to how a nation can become a Republic by abolishing the Crown and the 
allegiance to the Crown, and at the same time retain a full membership of 
a united Commonwealth, which is and must be basically a Crown 
Commonwealth.”40
Similarly, Menzies argued against Indian independence, believing Indians 
had not shown a “real … capacity for self-government,” whereas Chifley was 
supportive.41 This reveals not just differences of opinion between Menzies 
and Chifley, but different understandings of Australian identity, in which 
Chifley saw Australia’s future in Asian engagement while Menzies took a 
more cautious approach. The support of both men for the White Australia 
policy, however, ultimately suggests both visions of Australian identity were 
racialized.
Jawaharlal nehru’s Official Silence and White Australia 
After independence, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the 
Indian High Commission in Australia debated whether or not it was 
appropriate to keep track of Australia’s immigration policy. It was concluded 
that, while it was not their place to complain, it was within their remit to 
report on the policy.42 Although it is certainly significant that India did not 
raise official concern over Australia’s restrictive immigration tactics, we can 
draw a useful comparison here with Canada. Canada and India did negotiate 
over the ending of Canada’s restrictions on Indian migration, and did so 
openly. This official discussion was based on hints from Canadian diplomats 
in 1947 that Canada would be open to doing so in order to remove the matter 
as a roadblock to close relations. As a result, Girija Shankar Bajpai, secretary 
general of the MEA, relayed to a Canadian diplomat, John Kearney, that he 
believed it would be impossible for India to remain part of the Commonwealth 
__________________
40 Robert Menzies, quoted at “India’s Status: ‘Mystery’, says Menzies,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Friday 29 April 1949, 1. 
41 Menzies, quoted in Gurry, Australia and India, 40.
42 National Archives India (NAI), “White Australia Policy,” Progs., Nos. 269-IANZ, 1949; NAI, 
“Immigration policy regarding Australia High Court’s decision referred to in the fortnightly report 
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as a dominion. It might be possible, however, to remain as a republic, 
although there were many political roadblocks. Or, as Kearney reported their 
meeting back to Ottawa: “There are certain obstacles which if not removed, 
might make even this latter arrangement impossible, the chief of which is 
the immigration policy of some of the other Commonwealth nations, more 
particularly Australia and Canada.”43
Canada eventually agreed to accept 150 Indian immigrants per year.44 
This choice removed a significant impediment to building closer relations 
with India. Ultimately, however, the miniscule size of the quota and its 
administration irritated some sections of the Indian MEA.45 Clearly then, the 
Indian position on non-interference with white-settler colonial states 
practising discrimination was not set in stone. It could have been changed 
had Australia hinted, like Canada, that it would not be offended by such 
discussions.
This silence aside, there was one occasion when Nehru publicly 
commented on the White Australia policy. When asked in 1949 if he thought 
there was a place for a “White Australia in Asia?”46 he responded that Australia 
could justify the policy in the short term, provided it was only done on an 
economic, not racial, basis. He added that in the long term “it is difficult to 
see in the world today how far it is possible to keep a vast continent 
undeveloped.”47 He went on to say that “Australia should not discriminate 
against the rights and privileges of Asians living there.”48 Nehru had only 
lightly attacked the policy, but the critique was obvious: the policy had been 
justified on racial grounds, as wealthy people of Asian backgrounds were not 
allowed to emigrate while poor Europeans were. The naming of the policy 
as “White Australia” and the refusal to take any Asian migrants whatsoever 
obviously implied that the policy was discriminatory on the basis of colour. 
As the Australian high commissioner to India, Mackay had argued for the 
introduction of a quota system. He believed the policy had been based on 
race, as “there [is] no other way to explain why Australia would refuse to 
take … a small number of Westernized Indian professionals.”49
__________________
43 John D. Kearney, “Dispatch to Ministry for External Affairs,” 27 May 1948, at Library and 
Archives Canada, RG26-A-1-c, file 127, part 1, 2. 
44 This point was made to the Canadians by Ramji R. Saksena, a more strongly anti-colonial 
diplomat. See Ramji R. Saksena to Laval Fortier, 6 July 1953, at Library and Archives Canada, RG26-
A-1-c, vol. 127, part. 2, no. 152-HC/53, 2. 
45 Saksena took issue with several administrative matters to do with the quota system. See Ramji 
R. Saksena to Harris, 2 February 1953 at Library and Archives Canada, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part 2, 
no. 16-HC/53, 1–5. 
46 AAP journalist quoted at Cairns Post, 24 January 1949, 1. 
47 Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted at “Nehru Warns Us that Racial Policies are Out,” Daily Telegraph 
(Sydney), 25 January 1949, at NAI, “White Policy of Australia,” file no. 208(2) – I.A.N.Z., 19.
48 Nehru, “Racial Policies are Out,” 19.
49 Iven Mackay to H.V. Evatt, “Dispatch 52/46,” 22 December 1946, in W. J. Hudson and Wendy 
Way, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, vol. 10, July- December 1946 (Canberra: Department 









































































Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
Australia’s External Affairs Minister Herb “Doc” Evatt was pressed as to 
whether or not Nehru’s comments on the White Australia policy had received 
negative press coverage. Evatt replied in parliament, as was reported back 
to Delhi: “So far from the Prime Minister of India has criticized the White 
Australia Policy, he supports it. That is my reading of Mr. Nehru’s statement 
and I think that is quite clear.”50 Evatt’s comment rests on a reading of the 
White Australia policy as being based on economics, not race, and intended 
to protect Australia’s budding egalitarian society. Evatt’s comments were 
attacked in the Indian press. The Amrita Bazar Patrika of Calcutta wondered 
at Evatt’s logic: “if it was a telepathic process - the Australian minister’s mind 
actioned on the mind of the distant Indian Prime Minister through emotional 
influence and he perceived that his precious policy found an echo in the 
mind of Pandit Nehru.”51 
The Search Light newspaper, of Patna, similarly mocked the argument, 
stating that “[o]ne cannot help rubbing one’s eyes in amazement at the 
statement of Dr. Evatt.”52 The Free Press Journal of Bombay argued that “not 
even Pandit Nehru can protest against every act of racial imperialism that is 
perpetuated in the world, today.” Nehru’s decision to not actively fight the 
policy, the newspaper stated, did not indicate support.53
In order to understand the official silence, we can look at Nehru’s policy 
of Panchsheel, or the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The concept 
was further extended into ten principles at the 1955 Afro-Asia conference 
in Bandung, and largely became the basis for the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Kurrupu has suggested that the White Australia policy was offensive to a 
non-aligned nation, and points out that after its dismantling by Harold Holt 
and Gough Whitlam, Whitlam was able to improve the two countries’ 
relationship while working with Indira Gandhi.54 India’s non-aligned stance, 
however, was ambivalent towards the White Australia policy. On the one 
hand, non-alignment was framed as opposition to imperialism worldwide. 
As a result, very little was said openly by diplomats, though it featured in 
much of their private communication and shaped India’s approach of using 
their diplomatic presence for the purpose of educating Australia. Non-
alignment, however, also targeted non-interference in domestic affairs. When 
outlining India’s position on racial discrimination in 1949, Nehru argued 
that India was committed to two policies, the first being that “each country 
should be free. There should be no colonial exploitation”; the second that 
“the world must recognise that there must be no racial discrimination.” 55 As 
__________________
50 “Telegram from Hicomind, Canberra to Foreign, New Delhi,” 15 February 1949 at NAI, “White 
Policy of Australia,” 27.
51 Anon, Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 14 February 1949 at NAI, “White Policy of Australia,” 28.
52 Anon, Search Light, Patna, 13 February 1949 at NAI, “White Policy of Australia,” 29.
53 Anon, Free Press Journal, Bombay, 11 February 1949, at NAI, “White Policy of Australia,” 32. 
54 Kurrupu, Non-Alignment and Peace, 197–241.
55 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Colonial Exploitation and Racial Discrimination,” Selected works of Jawaharlal 
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a result, India did not interfere directly, even though the policy offended 
India’s strong dislike of racial discrimination. Rather, they were tactful in 
achieving their goals. When referring to South Africa’s presence in the 
Commonwealth, Nehru commented in the Rajya Sabha that “many of us laid 
stress on the incompatibility of any country being in the Commonwealth 
which followed racial policies.”56
Nehru’s comments on India’s opposition to colonialism, initially 
referencing events in South Africa, turned to problems of racialism 
throughout world affairs more broadly. His statement perfectly summarizes 
his personal approach to White Australia:
The problem of racialism and racial separation may become more 
dangerous than any other problem that the world has to face… They 
hurt us. Simply because we cannot do anything effective, and we do not 
want to cheapen ourselves by mere shouting, we remain quiet. But the 
thing has gone deep down into our minds and hearts. We feel it strongly.57
Nehru clearly opposed racial discrimination worldwide. He saw, however, his 
ability to effect change was limited, and was unwilling to cheapen himself 
by “mere shouting.” Instead, Nehru and India saved its most vocal 
condemnations for South Africa.58 But this silence should not be interpreted 
as a lack of interest in opposing racial discrimination elsewhere.
Nehru’s ideational project, however, had a similarly ambivalent relationship 
with his Englishness and the empire. Even though he opposed British rule 
in India, Nehru was frequently described as an Anglophile in reminiscences 
on his life.59 He famously (reportedly) once described himself as the “last 
Englishman to rule India.” His thought was inflected by British liberalism, 
but was also influenced by Indian nationalism and thinkers such as Marx, 
Tagore, and Gandhi.60 In 1948, Nehru emphasized what Australia and India 
shared, stating in a message to Australia that “[w]e stand, as I believe Australia 
does, for democratic freedom, for human rights and for the ending of the 
political domination or economic exploitation of one nation or group of 
another. We should cooperate, therefore, for the extension of freedom, 
equality and social justice.”61 
__________________
56 Jawaharlal Nehru, “South Africa Leaves the Commonwealth,” in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, 
vol. 4, September 1957-April 1963 (New Delhi: JNMF, 1964), 339.
57 Nehru, “India and World Affairs,” 314. 
58 Bhagavan, The Peacemakers. 
59 For example, Shashi Tharoor, Nehru: the Invention of India (New York: Penguin, 2003), 124.
60 See Priya Chacko, “The Internationalist Nationalist: pursuing an ethical modernity with 
Jawaharlal Nehru,” in International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and 
Investigations of Global Modernity, ed. Robbie Shilliam (New York : Routledge, 2011), 178–196.
61 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Message to Australia,” 19 March 1948 in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 









































































Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
The colonial connection did not have to be negative for India-Australia 
relations, should Australia have abandoned its racial policies. At Bandung 
in 1955 Nehru stated “I would like Australia and New Zealand to come nearer 
to Asia. I would welcome them because I do not want what we say or do to 
be based on racial prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism 
elsewhere.”62 Here, by evoking British values of freedom and democracy, 
Nehru sought to critique the racial discrimination practiced by Australia. 
And therein lies the ambivalence: colonialism connected Australia and India 
but simultaneously kept them separate. Whereas previously these values had 
been restricted to white imperial Britons, Nehru used them to attack racism 
elsewhere.
Indian Perceptions of Australia, from Chifley to Menzies
In order to move past Nehru’s silence, I examine senior diplomats who 
managed diplomatic relations on a day-to-day basis. The first Indian high 
commissioner to Australia was Ragunath Paranjpye, appointed by the British 
India government. Paranjpye served only during the Chifley government, 
from 1944 to 1947. Archival material is limited, but in his memoirs, he recalls 
that for him, “there were no intricate political questions between the 
countries” during his time in Australia.63 For Paranjpye, “the main function 
of the High Commissioner and his Office was to make India better known 
to Australia.”64 This being the case, the main struggle for Paranjpye was the 
White Australia policy, concerning which he wrote that “naturally this causes 
a great deal of heart-burning and resentment among non-white people,” 
and particularly offended Indians.65 
He emphasized also that, while this was offensive to India, it was not India’s 
place to attack Australian domestic policy. He believed that changing this 
policy would require “a change of public opinion in the country concerned, 
and this can best be brought about by a better understanding among different 
nations.”66 Thus, education about India was his focus, so he travelled Australia 
to dispel stereotypes about Indians. This became an important approach for 
other senior Indian diplomats in Australia. Paranjpye saw Australia’s 
stereotypical views on Indians as holding back the relationship. 
Daya Singh Bedi, India’s second high commissioner to Australia, served 
during the transition from Chifley to Menzies. For Bedi, Australia’s 
positioning within Asia was limited by the vocal and extreme rhetoric of 
__________________
62 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Asia and Africa Awake,” in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, vol. 3, March 
1953–1957 (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of 
India, 1958). 
63 Ragunath P. Paranjpye, Eighty-Four Not Out (Delhi: National Book Trust, 1961), 131. 
64 Paranjpye, Eighty-Four Not Out, 131.
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Chifley’s immigration minister, Arthur Calwell, whose more bombastic 
statements received considerable negative press coverage in India.67 Bedi 
commented to New Delhi that policy shifts were likely with the defeat of the 
Chifley government and the incoming Menzies administration. He noted 
that “[t]he present government is likely to depart considerably from the 
international policy of ‘rugged individualism’ followed by Dr. Evatt,” 
concluding that Australia would “go in for a closer association between 
London, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and the United States of 
America … In fact, their foreign policy will … be dictated by London and 
they are all out to have the friendliest of relations with the United States of 
America.68
Bedi expected the departure of Calwell as immigration minister to improve 
relations, however, as he was, according to Bedi, “not only unpopular abroad 
but became so in his own country.”69 He went so far as to express the hope 
that with Calwell’s departure “the international atmosphere in the Pacific 
Area will improve.”70 
Bedi’s commentary on Menzies was hopeful, stating that the Menzies 
government had “great regard for India” and that it had the belief that “if 
India and Australia understood each other better, they could do a lot of good 
in South East Asia.”71 However, despite these pleasantries, there was a sense 
that Australia would move quickly towards closer alignment with the US and 
the UK, as opposed to Chifley’s efforts in attending the Asia conferences of 
1947 and 1949. He remarked that “this government is more concerned 
regarding Asiatic countries than European because of the communist 
danger.”72 For Bedi, it was not so much the Cold War that kept Australia and 
India apart, but Australia’s obsession with it. This is an interesting 
counterpoint to Crocker, who similarly believed that the Indian obsession 
with racial discrimination held back the relationship. These earliest Indian 
diplomats in Australia appreciated Chifley’s approach, even though they also 
found Calwell’s aggressive rhetoric to be concerning. They were equally 
concerned that Menzies would take Australia even further away from 
engagement with Asia. 
Like Paranjpye, Bedi was keen to raise the profile of India in Australia by 
travelling. He reported the following to the MEA on a visit to Queensland: 
“although there is no racial discrimination, particularly in the common man, 
there is that racial prejudice which is inherent in the white man and it will 
__________________
66 Paranjpye, Eighty-Four Not Out, 131.
67 For a collection of multiple articles in the Indian press, see National Archives Australia, A1838: 
169/10/8/3/1 “India – Relations with Australia – Migration to Australia – Asiatics.”
68 Daya Singh Bedi to Y.D. Gundevia, 31 December 1949 at NAI, “Australia’s Attitude Towards 
India,” 105 I.A.N.Z. 50, 16.
69 Bedi to Gundevia, 16.
70 Bedi to Gundevia, 16.
71 Bedi to Gundevia, 16.
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take time before that is finally eradicated.”73 This led him to argue that “they 
will be inclined to adhere to the tradition of following in the wake of the 
British and to an extent the United States of America,” as Australia was “very 
much concerned to save [its] “white democracy” in the southern 
hemisphere.”74 These first two Indian diplomats to Australia both perceived 
Australia’s close ties with the US and the UK and Australia’s racial prejudices 
as stifling its ability to engage with India. 
Walter Crocker and the Indian “Preoccupation” with Race Discrimination
Given that Nehru and his early diplomats tended towards viewing Australia 
as a racist, fearful colonial outpost in need of education regarding India, it 
becomes crucial to consider how Australian diplomats and leaders viewed 
India. Menzies stated in his memoirs that India was too confusing a place 
for any “occidental” to understand: a classic colonial stereotype.75 As Crocker 
noted, Menzies showed no interest in India when he was there. Menzies did 
not want to see the sights and did not ask any questions.76 His lack of interest 
is telling in itself, but richer and as yet unexplored material is found in 
Crocker’s despatches during his many years as the high commissioner. 
Australia’s first high commissioner to India was General Iven Mackay. 
Mackay was sent to India in 1943, and predominantly dealt with military 
matters until the end of World War Two. He retired from the military in 1946 
but completed his term as high commissioner, primarily promoting trade 
and allowing Indian students to study in Australia.77 Herbert Gollan replaced 
Mackay in 1948. Gollan was similarly focused on trade, having served as 
Australia’s trade commissioner under Mackay.78 Throughout their time in 
India, both men repeatedly argued for allowing a small number of Indians 
to immigrate to Australia.79
Crocker replaced Gollan in 1952. He had formerly served as a colonial 
administrator in Nigeria, after fighting in World War Two with the British 
army. He went on to be the high commissioner to India twice, from 1952 to 
1955 and again from 1958 to 1962. Crocker’s role in India and elsewhere 
has generally received considerable praise in Australian scholarship. James 
Cotton has considered Crocker’s role as a scholar-diplomat, as he went on 
__________________
73 Daya Singh Bedi, “Annual Report from Australia–1950,” at NAI, “Annual Report from 
Australia,” file no. 3 (3) R&I, 6–7.
74 Bedi, “Annual Report,” 6–7. 
75 Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memoirs of Men and Events (Adelaide: Penguin Books, 
1969), 92.
76 Meg Gurry, “Leadership and Bilateral Relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 
1949–1964,” Pacific Affairs 65, no. 4 (1992–1993): 513. 
77 Jeffrey Grey, “Mackay, Sir Iven Giffard (1882–1966),” Australian Dictionary of Biography 15 
(2000), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mackay-sir-iven-giffard-10977. 
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to become Australia’s first IR professor, taking up a post at the Australian 
National University.80 Crocker was fascinated with India and particularly 
Nehru, of whom he published what is generally taken to be a sound and 
insightful biography.81 Nehru reportedly said of Crocker that he was “a good 
man with clever ideas, unlike the Government he serves.”82 In his foreword 
to a recent edition, Ramachandra Guha argued that Crocker’s was the 
strongest short portrait of Nehru ever to be written.83 It was not without 
controversy in India, however, with one review calling it “misleading, 
superficial, unoriginal, condescending and patronizing.”84 
Crocker, Gollan, and Mackay all advocated allowing a token number of 
Indians into Australia, as Canada had done, so as to remove an impediment 
to the relationship.85 Crocker’s public material was respectful. His private 
despatches, however, were tinged with racial stereotypes. Australia had hoped 
India might be a useful ally in the Cold War, given India’s British-derived 
governmental structures and Commonwealth ties. In 1952, however, Crocker 
authored a report on “Indian feelings on race relations,” which suggested 
India’s “preoccupation”86 with race in international affairs might make 
communism attractive to Indians. Crocker found that India’s opposition to 
any forms of racism made it difficult to work with as an ally in international 
politics because it predisposes them “as it predisposes American negroes, to 
see some good in communism just because communism (or so they believe) 
abolishes race differences.”87 Crocker’s frustration with Indian foreign policy 
reappeared in his second term as high commissioner, leading him to describe 
Indians as “irrational” and “unteachable” over Australia’s position in New 
Guinea.88 The assumption here, just as is the case in much contemporary IR 
theory, is that racial discrimination is not real IR, and the focus should be 
on hard power matters such as the Cold War. 
In 1953, Crocker sent a dispatch considering the threat of communism 
in India. He argued that an emerging ethos in India that poverty, famine, 
drought, and disease were no longer an acceptable part of life turned Indians 
towards communism.89 The report went on to say that “poverty (as 
__________________
80 James Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations (Canberra: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2013), 209–236.
81 Walter Crocker, Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate (New Delhi: Random House India, 2012). 
82 Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Ramachandra Guha, “Foreword,” in Crocker, Nehru, ix. 
83 Guha, “Foreword,” xv. 
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86 Walter Crocker, “Indian Feelings on Race Relations” (1952) at NAA, A462: 618/2/6 “India- 
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Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
distinguished from starvation) is no longer considered an ideal but an evil.”90 
Indeed, colonial stereotypes pervade nearly all descriptions of the Indian 
people in Crocker’s language, such as the colonial tropes of native effeminacy 
and irrationality. They are based at least partly on perceptions of race: the 
“new” India was prone to violence and “mob intervention.”91 There was a 
new “proneness to violence,” Crocker argued, that was “more significant as 
it refers to a people who by tradition, and perhaps by nature, have been both 
gentle and resigned.”92 An increase in violence in India, of course, reflected 
the chaos in which Partition had left India. The connection between Partition 
and communal violence is not made here.
He further mocked the Indian approach to their colonization by the 
British by referring to education: “Nehru and his fellow nationalists ... it was 
a terrible thing that under the wicked British only 15 per cent of the 
population was literate.”93 As a result of this policy, states in India were 
burdened with trying to raise the literacy rate, which was not easy. Seeming 
to take some delight in the difficulties in modernizing India, particularly 
following Nehru’s criticism of the British for failing to educate Indians, 
Crocker’s use of the term “wicked” suggests that the Indians did not recognize 
the good that the British had done for them through their colonization.
The report was more hopeful with regard to the Indian peasantry. He 
believed that they would not follow communism and argued that “the Indian 
[peasant] has a strong strain of religion” and prefers “to be left alone and 
to doze in the sun” as long as they are “given two meals a day.”94 The Indian 
religious traditions, however, were also considered threatening: “the Indians 
are ... religious by nature; yet they are losing their old Hindu religion. 
Communism could supply a religion in place of it.”95 The implications here 
are somewhat paradoxical: Indians are “naturally” religious, but are 
simultaneously losing their Hindu religion. Crocker wished the relationship 
between India and Australia to move forward and believed that an 
immigration agreement would assist this. Clearly, though, the difference of 
perception in world affairs was not just a matter of geopolitics. Whereas 
Crocker saw communism as virulent and inherently threatening, India’s 
non-alignment and tendency towards socialist economics and swadeshi (self-
sufficiency) placed it on a different path.96 This led Crocker to argue that 
the Indians’ anti-colonial thinking blinded India to geopolitical realities. 
The disagreement over the Cold War, then, as outlined by Benveunti, Mohan, 
and Medcalf, was not just geopolitical but also ideational. 
__________________
90 Crocker, “Prospects for Communism,” 1.
91 Crocker, “Prospects for Communism,” 1.
92 Crocker, “Prospects for Communism,” 1.
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Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 4 – December 2015
General Cariappa and the White Australia Policy
India’s third high commissioner to Australia was General Kodandera M. 
Cariappa, who served from 1953 to 1956. He was a decorated general when 
he was pulled from a brief retirement at the request of Nehru. He was not 
known for having a diplomat’s temperament, but he was deeply respected 
across India and deeply idealistic towards the Commonwealth. 
Cariappa became best known in Australia, however, for his comments in 
opposition to the White Australia policy. While David Walker has provided 
an excellent historical account of this event, I seek to consider it in the 
context of the perceptions of Other at play in the relationship.97 Cariappa 
gave a speech in Brisbane arguing that it was bad for Australia’s broader 
relationship with India and with Asia. He was quoted as saying in the Courier 
Mail “what you people are doing is driving the people of India and Pakistan 
away from the British Commonwealth and into the arms of Communism.”98 
Cariappa wrote to Nehru, requesting to be sent home. Ratan K. Nehru, 
cousin of Jawaharlal and foreign secretary of the MEA, responded that “I 
have shown your letter to the PM. This was just a storm in a tea cup and 
shows how jittery the Australians are about their immigration policy.”99
Cariappa’s comments were widely attacked in the Australian press. An 
editorial in The Argus expressed the hope that the intensity of the debate 
would die down so that the matter could be discussed without “wanting to 
fling off our coats and punch General Cariappa and other critics on the 
nose.”100 In an effort to end the controversy, Cariappa clarified his position 
by trying to appeal to Commonwealth and military solidarity in an interview 
with Reveille (an official publication of the Australian Returned Services 
League).101 His argument was focused on the Commonwealth, which, as an 
Indian Army general, he held in high regard. He wrote that “Indians have 
shared in battles and shed their blood in protecting this precious heritage.”102 
For Cariappa, this meant that Indians “should not be denied a natural 
equality with other immigrants from countries of the British Commonwealth.”103 
__________________
97 For a strong historical account based on Cariappa’s papers, see David Walker, “General Cariappa 
encounters ‘White Australia’: Australia, India and the Commonwealth in the 1950s,” The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 34, 3 (2006): 389–406. 
98 My emphasis. In his papers, General Cariappa has written “I did not say this” after this comment. 
Though I cannot confirm this, I find it highly unlikely that Cariappa would have made this comment. 
Kodandera M. Cariappa, quoted in The Courier-Mail, June 23 1954, at NAI, General Cariappa Private 
Papers, part 1, group 47, no. 2.
99 Ratan K. Nehru to Kodandera M. Cariappa, 7 July 1954 at NAI, General Cariappa Private 
Papers, Group 23, part 1, no. 40b, 265. 
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Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations
His argument was also tied, perhaps due to its intended audience, to World 
War Two solidarity, as the offence to Indian servicemen is heightened as 
“tens of thousands of Germans and Italians have been encouraged to 
emigrate to Australia.”104 Here, Cariappa sought to evoke the colonial link 
between India and Australia, just as Modi and Abbott were to do in 2014, to 
create change in Australia. In Cariappa’s case, this did not prove successful. 
Following the negative press commentary, Cariappa wrote to N. Ragunath 
Pillai, the secretary general of the MEA. His comments revealed his perception 
of Australia’s anxiety about the world. He stated first that Indians were not 
treated well in Australia, and were not given the rights that they should have 
as citizens: “Having met a number of Indian settlers here and in New Zealand 
… I cannot help the feeling that the people of this country, although they 
profess to be very democratic, simple friendly and all that, have a very poor 
opinion of Asians in regard to our standards of living and so on.”105
He further wrote that he had tried to use the Commonwealth as a means 
of shifting opinions on Indians, because he was always told that “if we took 
you … what about the Chinese and the Japanese?”106 He concluded: “This 
is the way they think. They are scared stiff of Asians over-running their country 
if they relaxed their Immigration policy!!”107 Here, the ideational clash 
between India and Australia becomes clearer: Indian diplomats saw 
Australians as needlessly anxious about Asia, while the Australians saw the 
Indians as needlessly obsessed with racial discrimination. Feeling unable to 
leave, at it would be seen as a firing, Cariappa switched his mission in Australia 
to changing the Australian people’s mind with regard to Indians and Asia 
in general. Cariappa eventually settled on the same plan as Paranjpye and 
Bedi: to travel throughout Australia so as to personally disrupt Australia’s 
stereotypical vision of Indians. 
Cariappa further expressed his irritation at Australia’s obsession with its 
economic and racial fears, though this time it was with regards to the 
standards of living rather than the immigration policy. He complained in 
his annual report of 1954: “in everything they say or do, I frequently hear, 
to the extent of being tired of hearing, such expressions as ‘we must maintain 
our high standards of living and therefore we must have only such people 
living with us who have our high standards.’”108 He continued: “I have often 
asked Australians what exactly this means… no one has given me a satisfactory 
answer.”109 Cariappa wrote without the diplomatic niceties of Paranjpye and 
__________________
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Bedi. Australia, he added, “seems to be obsessed with the fear that 
Communism is almost at her door-steps and her security, therefore, is very 
gravely in danger.”110 These comments show a deep sense of frustration with 
Australia’s perception of the world. Idealistic as he was about the 
Commonwealth, Australia’s anxieties about Asia and Asian immigration led 
him to question these beliefs. 
Cariappa completed his full term as high commissioner. He was generous 
in his farewell message to Australia, stating that he would miss the country 
and had enjoyed his many travels there. He again aimed to disrupt stereotypes: 
“India is not the land of snakes, mosquitoes, beggars and rope-tricksters only, 
as some imagine it to be, as Australia is not merely a land of Kangaroos and 
Koala Bears.”111 
Cariappa’s comments on the White Australia policy were considered in 
the Australian MEA, but not raised officially with India. Crocker kept track 
of the matter without lodging an official protest. He avoided speaking with 
R.K. Nehru regarding the issue, believing him to be “fanatical about colour, 
race, etc.”112 Crocker did, however, discuss the matter with the Commonwealth 
Secretary Subimal Dutt, who reportedly told him that India had “no interest 
in Australian immigration policy.”113 Crocker concluded that Cariappa’s 
“standing with the powers-that-be here is weak” and that the MEA believed 
him to “have failed in Australia … due to his vanity.” Furthermore, he 
suggested that Dutt “obviously thinks that Cariappa is not all there” in his 
failure to follow the government line.114 Crocker believed that Cariappa’s 
actions had damaged India-Australia relations, as well as the cause (which 
Croker himself supported) of changing Australia’s immigration policy. 
Furthermore, Crocker wished that Cariappa would “keep silent” as he had 
“no understanding of the basic forces and factors in Australian life.”115 Given 
that Cariappa stayed on in Australia, and travelled much of the country 
generating considerable press coverage, Crocker misread the intentions of 
the MEA. From the Australian press and Cariappa disagreeing over what was 
originally said, to Crocker’s thinking that Cariappa would be sent back to 
India, this affair is another example of India and Australia misunderstanding 
one another. Cariappa’s perception of Australia as overly fearful and the 
Australian press perceiving Cariappa as hypersensitive and meddling portray 
a very tense relationship between these two former colonies. The history of 
__________________
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India-Australia relations in this period is not one of shared history, but one 
of consistent ideational conflict, misunderstanding, and misperception. 
Conclusion: Shared History and India-Australia Relations
A re-examination of the relationship of India and Australia from an ideational 
perspective reveals a very different picture. Even though Australia and India 
were historically entangled through the British Empire, colonial histories 
and their subsequent postcolonial identities have clearly been divisive in 
India-Australia relations. Both sides had ideational ambivalences towards 
one another on the basis of their colonial connections. This poor relationship 
was certainly not inevitable. At this formative stage, however, the relationship 
was undermined repeatedly through different understandings about the 
nature of the postcolonial world. Colonial histories, and the identities they 
created, led to consistent misunderstandings. Although it would be wrong 
to say there was no shared history, it is misleading in the extreme to argue 
that this colonial history has been positive in the India-Australia relationship. 
The relationship between India and Australia now appears to be growing, 
after Modi’s visit to Australia and the much-vaunted nuclear deal. And yet, 
as seen in the media furores over attacks on Indian students in Australia and 
the “Khobragade affair” in the US, India’s relationship with these post-
imperial powers can still rapidly devolve into accusations of Western racism 
and Indian hyper-sensitivity.116 Just as they did after the Cold War, India and 
Australia still disagree fundamentally on many crucial global issues. India 
continues to support Iran, maintains close ties with Russia, resists the NPT, 
will not join the Trans-Pacific Partnership and looks to BRICS for solidarity 
with the “global south,” while openly seeking a “polycentric” world order. 
These positions all echo India’s postcolonial identity, as seen in the early 
Cold War period. Australia has undoubtedly moved closer to Asia, long ago 
dismantled the White Australia policy and become a far more open and 
multicultural society since the period examined here. And yet, it maintains 
its links to the US and the UK and is broadly supportive of US hegemony 
over world order. Changing this aspect of India-Australia relations requires 
more than just the political will displayed by Narendra Modi and Tony Abbott. 
Rather, for the relationship to move forward, there needs to be a shift in the 
ways in which India and Australia imagine world politics. Without this, India 
and Australia will continue to misunderstand one another regardless of how 
much desire there is to engage. 
The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia, May 2015
__________________
116 Only twenty-three attacks are now estimated to have been racially motivated. See: Anon, “Only 
23 of 152 Oz attacks racist, Ministry tells LS,” 25 February 2010 at http://archive.indianexpress.com/
news/only-23-of-152-oz-attacks-racist-ministry-tells-ls/584247/.
